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INTRODUCTION

N RECENT YEARS the courts, legislatures, and regulatory
agencies have rendered numerous policy decisions in order
to encourage reporting and analysis of aviation incidents in
hopes of obtaining the most accurate and complete information
necessary to improve and maintain the safety standards of the
industry. Qualified privileges and immunities help achieve this
compelling public policy goal by guarding those who self-report
aviation incidents or violations of federal aviation regulations
("FARs") to the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") and
those who undertake their own internal investigations of an incident or safety condition that may later give rise to civil litigation.
These privileges and immunities shield such information provided or developed in a self-critical nature from being used
against the person or corporation later in FAA enforcement actions or civil litigation.
This paper discusses the development of such privileges and
immunities-including the self-critical analysis privilege, the Aviation Safety Reporting Program ("ASRP"), the Aviation Safety Action Program ("ASAP"), and the privilege afforded to military
investigations and reports for accidents involving military
aircraft.
II.

THE SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE: LEGAL,
PRACTICAL, AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

During discovery in a civil case against a corporation, a plaintiff seeks to obtain the corporation's internal investigation documents, which may reveal specific information about the
corporation that could be relevant to the plaintiffs case. Is the
corporation obligated to produce the documents? One barrier
to discovery of such materials is the controversial self-critical
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analysis privilege, or self-evaluative privilege, that has gradually
developed over the last thirty years. Over this period of time,
the public policy need for accurate and complete information
concerning safety has become increasingly apparent, and more
corporations are expected to self-police their conduct and policies. In recent years, Congress and federal regulatory agencies
have increasingly shifted responsibility for monitoring corporations from the public to the private sector.' As a result, corporate managers are under more pressure than ever to conduct
recurring internal investigations in assessing the corporation's
compliance with governmental regulations and mandates, and
to keep a handle on ethical and societal expectations of how a
corporation should conduct its business. 2 In civil litigation, access to these corporate internal investigations may be permitted
and "a self-evaluating corporation will have often unwittingly invested substantial time and financial resources to produce a
'smoking gun' for its opponents in future litigation."3
As with any new privilege, the self-critical analysis privilege has
numerous and apparent inconsistent variations depending on
the jurisdiction, and many courts have outright rejected the
privilege. 4 The privilege also varies dramatically depending on
the circumstances of each case, and the trend appears to be a
narrowing of situations to which the privilege may apply. In
cases in which it is asserted, the privilege is raised in response to
a discovery request for certain categories of information and
specific documents, and to date, does not appear to be an evidentiary issue. 5

1 See RobertJ. Bush, Stimulating CorporateSelf-Regulation - The CorporateSelf-Evaluative Privilege:ParadigmaticPreferenctialism or PragmaticPanacea,87 Nw. U. L. REV.
597 (1993).
2 Id. at 598.
3 Id. at 599.
4 See e.g., Cloud v. Litton Indus., Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 366 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996); Combined Communications Corp. v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 865 P.2d
893, 897 (Col. Ct. App. 1993); Siskonen v. Stanadyne, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 610, 612
(W.D. Mich. 1989).
5 See James F. Flanagan, Rejecting a General Privilegefor Self-Critical Analyses, 51
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 551, 553 (May 1983). In Combined Communications. Corp. v.
Public Service Co. of Colorado, 865 P.2d 893 (Col. Ct. App. 1993), the Colorado
Public Service Commission unsuccessfully asserted the self-critical analysis privilege as a basis for arguing that a jury considered inadmissible evidence during
the trial.
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A.

HISTORY OF THE SELF-CRITICAL ANALYsis PRIVILEGE

The self-critical analysis privilege was first established in a federal district court in a medical malpractice case, Bredice v. Doctor's Hospital,6 in the context of internal self-investigations and
evaluations of hospitals and medical facilities. In that case, the
plaintiff sought production of minutes and reports from the
board and committees of the defendant hospital and any other
reports concerning the death of plaintiffs decedent.' The meetings held by the board and committees of the hospital were pursuant to the Joint Commissions on Accreditation of Hospitals,
which is a private entity that sets standards for the accreditation
of hospitals.8 Pursuant to the regulations, the sole purpose of
such meetings was the improvement of care and treatment.9
The court held that the overwhelming public need for such selfevaluations of hospitals warranted the confidentiality of such
evaluations, and stated the following:
Confidentiality is essential to effective functioning of these staff
meetings; and these meetings are essential to the continued improvement in the care and treatment of patients. Candid and
conscientious evaluation of clinical practices is a sine qua non of
adequate hospital care. To subject these discussions and deliberations to the discovery process, without a showing of exceptional
necessity, would result in terminating such deliberations. Constructive professional criticism cannot occur in an atmosphere of
apprehension that one doctor's suggestion will be used as a denunciation of a colleague's conduct in a malpractice suit.1"
The court noted that meetings "retrospective with the purpose of self-improvement" are entitled to a qualified privilege
on the basis of the "overwhelming public interest."1 1 Many state
legislatures have codified the privilege to protect the discoverability of certain medical peer reviews, while some courts have
restricted documents included in the medical peer review privi12
lege to only those documents specified by the legislature.
Although the privilege was first established in the context of
medical peer reviews, it was expanded by another federal court
6 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), affd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
7 Id. at 249.
8 Id. at 250.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 250.

11 Id. at 251.
12 See, e.g., Konrady v. Oesterling, 149 F.R.D. 592, 598 (D. Minn. 1993); exparte
Cryer v. Corbett, 814 So. 2d 239, 249 (Ala. 2001).
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to include internal corporate evaluations of employment practices in Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia, Co.13 In Banks, the plaintiff,
who alleged employment discrimination, sought internal reports prepared by employees of Lockheed-Georgia, a defense
14
contractor, regarding the company's compliance with Title VII

and Executive Order 11,246.15 The applicable regulations required certain government contractors to develop a written affirmative action compliance program based on detailed
guidelines. 6 The court prevented disclosure of the documents,
reasoning that it would be contrary to public policy to permit
access to the internal materials because such access would "discourage frank self-criticism and evaluation in the development
of affirmative action programs of this kind."' 7 The court, however, required Lockheed-Georgia to produce all "factual and statistical information" that was available to it at the time that the
study was conducted.18
Since Banks, many federal and state courts have applied the
privilege to similar internal assessments of employment practices in employment discrimination suits,' 9 while others have rejected it. 20 Courts and legislatures have further expanded the
53 F.R.D. 283, 285 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
Tide VII, which is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq., was enacted as
part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII makes it unlawful for a private
employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex or national origin." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1)
(2004).
15 Executive Order 11,246, dated September 24, 1965, enunciated a policy of
equal employment opportunity in government employment by federal contractors and subcontractors and federally assisted construction contracts regardless of
race, creed, color, or national origin. Exec. Order 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319
(Sept. 24, 1965). Executive Order 11,375, dated October 13, 1967, amended Executive Order 11,246 to include discrimination on the account of sex. See Exec.
Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (Oct. 13, 1967).
16 See 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10-2.18 (2004).
17 Banks v. Lockheed-Ga. Co., 53 F.R.D. at 285.
13
14

18 Id.

19 See, e.g., Joiner v. Hercules, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 695, 699 (S.D. Ga. 1996);
O'Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.R.D. 211, 218 (D. Mass. 1980); Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. Civ. 2205, 1999 WL 511673, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1999); Troupin
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 169 F.R.D. 546, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Clarke v. Mellon Bank, No. Civ. A92-CV-4823, 1993 WL 170950 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 1993); Penk
v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 99 F.R.D. 506, 507 (D. Or. 1982).
2000 WL
20 See, e.g., Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., No. Civ. A198-CV-3679,
33249254, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2000); Johnson v. UPS, Inc., 206 F.R.D. 686,
693 (M.D. Fla. 2002); Tharp v. Sivyer Steel Corp., 149 F.R.D. 177, 185 (S.D. Iowa
1993); Webb v.Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431, 436 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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privilege to shield from discovery police department and government internal investigative documents.21 In this context, it is
often referred to as the "deliberative privilege. ' 22 Some courts
have even applied the self-critical analysis privilege to a corpora23
tion's internal investigations regarding environmental issues,
product liability cases, 24 and developmental research of institutional bodies.25
The United States Supreme Court, in University of Pennsylvania
v. E.E.O.C.,26 dampened the expansion of the privilege, although the Court did not expressly address the viability of the
self-critical analysis privilege. In that case, the EEOC sought
faculty peer review documents during its investigation of a sexual discrimination charge by one of the University's professors.
The University claimed the documents were privileged because
they contained "confidential peer review information. '2' The
Court, however, refused to create a privilege for peer review
documents primarily because Congress specifically did not create such a privilege in Title VII. 28 The Court stated that federal
courts should' 29not exercise their authority to create privileges
"expansively.
Notably, in this case, the government, rather
than a private litigant, was the party seeking disclosure of the
documentation. The decision shows that in balancing disclosure and the need for confidentiality, courts will justifiably find
that the government's need for the information outweighs the
need for confidentiality. The rationale for this is that the government has the onus of creating and enforcing its regulations,
21 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d 268, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Kay v. Pick,
711 A.2d, 1251, 1256 (D.C. App. 1998); Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig.,
181 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Ga. 1998); Thompson v. Lynbrook Police Dep't, 172 F.R.D.
23, 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying deliberative privilege to district attorney's files).
But see City of Hemet v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(rejecting protection of police department internal report).
22 The deliberative process privilege is frequently invoked by government
agencies seeking to protect from discovery internal reports and materials. "Generally, it protects an agency from disclosing confidential deliberations of law or
policymaking, reflecting opinions, recommendations, or advice." Myers v. Uniroyal Chem. Co, No. Civ.A.916716, 1992 WL 97822, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 1992).
23 See Reichold Chem., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 527 (N.D. Fla.
1994).
24 See Shipes v. BIC Corp., 154 F.R.D. 301, 307 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
25 See Plough, Inc. v. Nat'l Acad. of Scis., 530 A.2d 1152 (D.C. App. 1987).
26 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
27 Id. at 186-88.
28 Id. at 189.
29

Id.
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and corporations should not be able to avoid Title VII or other
regulations by preventing the government's access to such documents. Despite the Supreme Court's decision in University of
Pennsylvania, the self-critical analysis is still viable in federal
courts to varying degrees.3 0

B.

RATIONALE FOR THE PRIVILEGE-THE "CHILLING EFFECT"
OF DISCLOSURE

The rationale for the self-critical analysis lies in the possible

"chilling effect" that disclosure of corporate internal investigations may have upon an industry's or corporation's future attempts to monitor and improve safety. 1 One court explained
the rationale aptly by stating:
The underlying principle is that if a party has conducted a confidential analysis of its own performance in a matter implicating a
substantial public interest, with a view towards correction of errors, the disclosure of that analysis in the context of litigation
may deter the party from conducting such a candid review in the
future.32
The concern is that disclosure of such documents reflecting

candid self-evaluations by corporations "will deter or suppress
socially useful investigations and evaluations or compliance with
the law or with professional standards. '33 The self-critical analysis privilege may encourage corporations to continually monitor
safety measures and operations, with a view toward correcting
mistakes and minimizing safety without fear that these efforts
would later be used against them in civil litigation. 4
30 See Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 199 F.R.D. 379 (N.D. Ga.
2001) (discussing, in the context of a Title VII case, in which a private litigant
sought internal corporate analysis of employment discrimination, the viability of
the self-critical analysis privilege despite the Supreme Court's ruling in University
of Pennsylvania). The Reid court reasoned that the Supreme Court's decision
demonstrates that the application of privileges pursuant to Rule 501 should be
decided on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 384. Other courts have interpreted the
University of Pennsylvaniadecision to exclude the self-critical analysis only in the
context of employment discrimination. See, e.g., Johnson v. UPS., Inc., 206
F.R.D. 686, 693 (2002).
31 See Todd v. S. Jersey Hosp. Sys., 152 F.R.D 676, 682 (D. NJ. 1993), rev'd on the
grounds, 960 F. Supp. 835 (D. NJ. 1997); Brunt v. Hunterdon County 183 F.R.D.
181, 185 (D.NJ. 1998).
32 Wimer v. Sealand Servs., Inc., No. 96-CV-8730, 1997 WL 375661, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 3, 1997) (citing Chem. Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., Nos. 87 Civ.
0150 (VLP) et seq., 1994 WL 89292, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1994).
33Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
34 See Hickman v. Whirlpool Corp., 186 F.R.D. 362, 363 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
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To protect disclosure of a corporation's safety measures, a
federal district court found this rationale for the self-critical
analysis privilege compelling in Hickman v. Whirlpool Corp. 5 In
that case, a worker brought suit against Whirlpool for personal
injuries related to an industrial accident.3 6 The plaintiff sought
minutes from Whirlpool's proactive safety team and a plant
safety report prepared by one of Whirlpool's employees.3 7 The
court held that Whirlpool would not be compelled to produce
the documents because the documents contained self-critical
analysis, and that "the public has a strong interest in preserving
this type of data collection and dialog within industries. '38 The
court reasoned that disclosure would do "great damage" to
Whirlpool's efforts to improve safety and to the industry as a
whole, and public policy favored such efforts in order to im39
prove safety.
C.

CURRENT CONTOURS OF THE PRIVILEGE

The self-critical analysis privilege has led a "checkered existence."4 0 The privilege is widely regarded as ambiguous because
courts have neither uniformly adopted nor rejected the privilege.4 1 A survey of the case law in federal courts concerning the
privilege shows that such a characterization is accurate. Although some courts reject the privilege, 42 the customary treatment of the privilege is much more ambiguous. More often
than not, courts considering the privilege reject its application
while impliedly accepting that the privilege may apply under different circumstances. The result has been an overall narrowing
of the privilege as federal courts consider it on a case-by-case
basis. Although most decisions involving the privilege arise in
35 Id. at 364.
36 Id. at 363.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.

40 Wimer v. Sealand Serv., Inc., No. 96-CV-8730, 1997 WL 375661, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 3, 1997).
41 See Holland v. Muscatine Gen. Hosp., 971 F. Supp. 385, 390 (S.D. Iowa
1997); Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., No. Civ. A198-CV-3679, 2000 WL 33249254, at
*5 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2000).
42 See, e.g., Robbins & Myers, Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., No. 01-CV-0201, 2003
WL 21384304, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. May 9, 2003); Hawthorne Land Co. v. Occidental
Chem. Corp., No. Civ. A 01-0881, 2003 WL 21510426, at *1 (E.D. La. June 24,
2003); Williams v. Vulcan-Hart Corp., 136 F.R.D. 457, 460 (W.D. Ky. 1991).
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federal district courts, some United States Courts of Appeals
4
have explicitly recognized the privilege. 1
At least one court has held that the criteria needed to qualify
for the self-critical analysis privilege varies according to the type
of case in which it is asserted. The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Tice v. American Airlines, Inc.4 4 held that
two distinct formulations have emerged for cases involving employment discrimination and personal injury cases. There is a
"fundamental difference between tort cases, which involve voluntary self-evaluations designed to enhance safety, and discrimination cases, which involve the fairness of disclosing documents
written pursuant to a legal mandate. 4 5 Although this analysis is
simplistic given the numerous situations in which self-evaluations are performed to enhance safety, the companies performing such self-evaluations are heavily regulated, as in the aviation
context. In Tice, the self-critical analysis privilege was successfully asserted to prevent disclosure of American Airlines' safety
reports.4 6
Rule 26(b) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[p] arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the action. 4 7 Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
governs issues of privileges in federal courts, provides the following in pertinent part:
[E]xcept as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege
of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as
to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the4 8 privilege...
shall be determined in accordance with State law.
43 See ASARCO, Inc., Tenn. Mines Div. v. N.L.R.B., 805 F.2d 194 (6th Cir.
1986); In re Burlington N., Inc., 679 F.2d 762, 765 (8th Cir.).
44 192 F.R.D. 270, 272 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
45 Id. at 273 (citing Morgan v. Union Pac. R.R., 182 F.RD. 261, 266 (N.D. Ill.
1996).
46 Id.

47 FED.

R. Cry. P. 26 (b) (1).

R. EVID. 501. In cases that involve pendant state law claims in a federal
question case, federal common law regarding privileges applies. See S. Rep. No.
1277, 93 reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7075 n.16.
48 FED.
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The liberality of Rule 501 gives federal courts the discretion to
recognize privileges under federal common law "in light of reason and experience" in cases where Congress has not acted and
which state law does not supply the rule of decision.4 9 The recognition of new privileges in federal court thus evolves on a
case-by-case basis.5 0 Although the development of privileges
under federal common law is pragmatic, the analysis begins with
the "fundamental principle that 'the public has a right to every
man's evidence.' "51 Of course, if a claim or defense is based on
state law, the question of privilege is determined in accordance
with state law. Many federal courts examining whether to apply
the self-critical analysis privilege in the context of a state law
claim consider whether the applicable state would recognize the
privilege if there are no state court decisions addressing the
privilege.5 2
Ordinarily, determining whether the materials sought are relevant marks the starting point in the analysis of a discovery dispute. Generally, the relevancy of the documents in question is
established because the documents pertain to pre-incident
safety meetings and reports; post-accident investigation, meetings and reports; or routine internal investigations undertaken
in the process of preparing a government-mandated report. It is
important to note that the privilege may also be asserted by a
third-party to the litigation who receives a subpoena duces
tecum.5 3
Once relevancy is established, the court must determine (1)
whether the particular jurisdiction recognizes the privilege,
whether it be state law or federal common law, and if so, (2)
whether the privilege will be recognized under the particular
circumstances of the case. When the dispute arises, and the
party seeking protection of documents claims the self-critical
analysis privilege, many courts view the disputed documents in
- See Cloud v. Litton Indus., Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 379 (Cal Ct. App.
1996).
50 SeeJaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996); Holland v. Muscatine Gen.
Hosp., 971 F. Supp. 385, 388-89 (S.D. Iowa 1997).
51 Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (quoting Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)).
52 See, e.g.,
Williams v. Vulcan-Hart Corp., 136 F.R.D. 457, 458 (W.D. Ky. 1991);
Siskonen v. Standyne, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 610, 612 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
53 See In re Health Mgmt., Inc., No. CV 96-0889, 1999 WL 33594132, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1999) (upholding privilege asserted by third party to litigation). But see LeClere v. Mut. Trust Life Ins. Co., No. C99-0061, 2000 WL
34027973, at *1 (N.D. Iowa June 14, 2000).
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camera before ruling whether the documents are protected by
the privilege. 54
In Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 55 the Ninth Circuit
articulated the most often cited criteria that must be established
by the party seeking protection:
First, the information must result from a critical self-analysis undertaken by the party seeking protection; second, the public
must have a strong interest in preserving the free flow of information respecting the subject matter; third, the information
must be of the type that the free flow would cease if the privilege
is not recognized. Lastly, any document produced as a result of
the self-critical analysis must be produced in the expectation of
confidentiality and it must actually have been kept confidential.56
As discussed below, many courts have held that in order to be
protected, the self-critical document must have also been created or prepared pursuant to a government mandate.
1.

Facts and Data Are Not Protected

The requirement that the documents protected must qualify
as self-analysis conducted by the party seeking protection limits
the application of the privilege to only self-evaluative or subjective analysis of data. Facts and objective data are not included in
the ambit of the privilege. 57 For example, an investigative report prepared by a ship's crewmembers after an incident involv54 See Gatewood v. Stone Container Corp., 170 F.R.D. 455, 459 (S.D. Iowa
1996).
55 971 F.2d 423, 425-426 (9th Cir. 1992). But see Union Pac. R.R. v. Mower, 219
F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the Ninth Circuit has never adopted
the privilege).
56 See Dowling, 971 F.2d at 426; MCI Worldcom Network Servs., Inc. v. Von
Behren Elec., Inc., No. Civ. A.1:00CV3311, 2002 WL 32166535, at *3 (N.D. Ga.
May 21, 2002); Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 199 F.R.D. 379, 386
(N.D. Ga. 2001). Other courts have articulated a different although similar fourprong test:
(1) the materials must have been prepared for mandatory government reports; (2) the privilege extends only to subjective evaluative
materials; (3) the privilege does not extend to objective data in any
such reports; and (4) discovery should be denied only where the
public policy favoring exclusion clearly outweighs the plaintiffs
need.
See Kern v. Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac, No. 3:96-CV-406, 1997 WL 816518, at *8
(N.D. Ind. Aug. 12, 1997); Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678, 684 (N.D.
Ind. 1985); Wittingham v. Amherst Coll., 164 F.R.D. 124, 129 (D. Mass. 1995).
57 See, e.g., Steinle v. Boeing Co., No. 90-1377, 1992 WL 53752, at *7 (D. Kan.
Feb. 4, 1992); Kern, 1997 WL 816518 at *8; Roberts, 107 F.R.D. at 684; Freiermuth
v. PPG Indus., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 694, 698 (N.D. Al. 2003).
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ing one of the ship's crew was held to be primarily factual while
recommendations for corrective action would arguably be
within the privilege.5" Where the documents at issue contain a
combination of factual and subjective analysis, courts applying
the privilege will order the party to produce only those portions
of the documents that are factual or statistical data.5 9 A court
may require an in camera inspection under these circumstances.
2.

Public Interest in the Subject Matter

In order for the privilege to apply, the public must have a
strong interest in preserving the free flow of information respecting the subject matter, since the privilege is intended to
"serve the public interest by encouraging self-improvement
through uninhibited self-analysis and evaluation."6 The privilege exists "out of concern for the public and is not personal to
the one asserting the privilege."6 1 One court found little public
concern where a corporation's investigation into employee misconduct exhibited its self-interested incentives in investigating
employee wrongdoing, thereby eliminating the need for additional protection to encourage such investigations.6 2 Similarly, a
corporation's investigation into a particular claim generally does
not qualify as privileged self-critical analysis. For example, if a
plaintiff seeks documents regarding the defendant's investigation of the plaintiffs particular claim, courts will not allow such
documents to be protected from disclosure by the privilege because the public does not have a strong interest in an investigation of a specific claim especially considering that the
documents are extremely relevant to plaintiffs claim. 63 In this
58 Wimer v. Sealand Service, Inc., No. 96-CIV-8730, 1997 WL 375661, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. July 3, 1997). In many cases, post-accident investigations will be covered by the work product doctrine if the investigations were conducted in anticipation of litigation.
59 Penk v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 99 F.R.D. 506, 507 (D. Or. 1982).
60 In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
61 Warren v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 540, 543 (E.D.N.C.
1995) (requiring disclosure of a broker's audit reports in an action by an investor
against a security broker); Ludwig v. Pilkington N.A., Inc., No. 03C1086, 2004 WL
1898238, *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2004).
62 See Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 228, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
63 See Wittingham v. Amherst Coll., 164 F.R.D. 124, 129-30 (D. Mass. 1995);
Myers v. Uniroyal Chem. Co., CIV. A. No. 916716, 1992 WL 97822, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
May 5, 1992); but see ASARCO, Inc., Tenn. Mines Div. v. N.L.R.B., 805 F.2d 194,
200 (6th Cir. 1986); Trezza v. Hartford Co., Inc., No. 98 CIV. 2205, 1999 WL
511673 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1999) (holding that internal investigations focused on addressing plaintiffs concerns were protected by the self-critical analy-
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context, the party seeking protection may have a valid workproduct claim depending on the jurisdiction and particular circumstances surrounding the creation of the disputed document. Courts have, however, found strong public policy
interests in internal employer evaluations of employment discrimination 64 and medical peer reviews.6 5
3.

Applies Only If Disclosure Would Stifle Analysis

The privilege will only be applied where disclosure would stifle or cramp self-evaluations in the future. At least one court has
stated that self-evaluations by companies will continue in the absence of such a privilege due to their need to remain competitive.6 6 However, most courts that acknowledge the privilege find
that disclosure would "curtail or hinder" future self-evaluation
by that company or the industry as a whole, which is a concern
that warrants protection. 67 Whether routine safety internal investigations would be stifled in the future if disclosed is unclear.
Some courts have held that such internal investigations would
be stifled by disclosure, thus warranting protection,6" while
others hold that voluntary routine safety reviews would not be
affected by disclosure because corporations may continue selfevaluations to remain competitive in the marketplace and because of other self-interested reasons.6"
sis privilege). Under the appropriate circumstances, however, such investigations
may be protected by the work product doctrine.
64 Troupin v. Metro. Life Ins., 169 F.R.D. 546, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Clarke v.
Mellon Bank, No. CIV. A-92-CV-4823, 1993 WL 170950, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 11,
1993); John v. Trane Co., a Div. of Am. Standard, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 855, 856
(S.D. Fla. 1993); Robbins v. Provena St. Joseph Med. Ctr., No. 03 C 1371, 2004
WL 502327, *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2004).
65 Brem v. Decarlo, Lyon, Hearn, Pazourek, P.A., 162 F.R.D. 94, 102 (D. Md.
1995); Weekoty v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1348 (D.N.M. 1998) (upholding assertion by United States that morbidity and mortality conferences
among governmental physicians are protected by the self-critical analysis
privilege).
66 Williams v. Vulcan-Hart Corp., 136 F.R.D. 457, 459 (W.D. Ky. 1991). See also
James F. Flanagan, Rejecting A General Privilege for Self-Critical Analyses, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 551, 561 (1983) ("Failure [of a company] to critically review its
performance inevitably leads to misperceptions about the market, and within a
short time, penalties from the marketplace.").
67 See, e.g., Hickman v. Whirlpool Corp., 186 F.R.D. 362, 364 (N.D. Ohio 1999);
Troupin, 169 F.R.D. at 549.
68 See Hickman, 186 F.R.D. at 364.
69 See Freiermuth v. PPG Indus., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 694, 697-698 (N.D. Al. 2003).
As the court noted:
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Confidentiality Required

In order for the privilege to be sustained, the targeted documents must have been kept confidential. If the evaluations or
reports alleged to be protected were prepared by an outside
consulting company, they may not be within the protection of
the privilege.7 0 Likewise, documents that contain information
available to the public in another form is not protected. 71 Documents likely to be protected include those prepared with the
intention of being kept confidential and those circulated on a
"need to know" basis. 72 Where the self-critical analysis is not required to be governmentally mandated, the confidentiality issue
may be problematic because disclosing documents and information to the government reduces the likelihood that the report and its contents will be kept confidential.7 3
5.

Government Mandated Reporting

Many courts, but not all, have held that the foundation of the
self-critical analysis privilege is the protection of documents that
comply with a mandatory governmental requirement.74 This is
The policy arguments espoused in support of recognizing a selfcritical analysis privilege in the employment context ring hollow in
this post-Enron era where corporate governance is not only expected, but en vogue. Today, companies employ more compliance
personnel than ever before for the very purpose of self-evaluating
compliance with various state and federal laws. Failure to engage
in self-critical analysis would be considered irresponsible by shareholders in today's environment. Cloaking self-evaluative materials
in privilege would be contrary to this climate of corporate glasnost.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Powell v. The New York City Health and Hosp.
Corp., No. 03 Civ. 3264 LTS DF, 2003 WL 22871908, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4,
2003).
70 Etienne v. Mitre Corp., 146 F.R.D. 145, 148 (E.D. Va. 1993) (holding that
there was no confidential relationship to protect because portions of the compliance reviews sought to be protected were performed by an outside consulting
firm).
71 Spencer v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., No. 98 CIV. 2817, 1999 WL 619637, at *549
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1999) (requiring defendant to produce recommendations for
corrective safety measures because the identical recommendations were contained in a document available to the public).
72 Troupin, 169 F.R.D. at 549.
73 See Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 199 F.R.D. 379, 387 (N.D. Ga.
2001) (holding that information mandated by a government agency lessens any
reasonable expectation that the information would remain confidential).
74 See, e.g., No. 90-1377, 1992 WL 53752, at *7 (D. Kan. Feb. 4, 1992); Sabratek
Liquidating LLC v. KPMG, LLP, No. 01-C-9582, 2002 WL 31520993, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 13, 2002); Kern v. Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac, No. 3:96-CV-406, 1997
WL 816518, at *8 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 12, 1997); Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D.
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so because courts recognizing the privilege "perceived unfairness in a rule that would allow the government to require companies to engage in self-critical analysis and then hand that
analysis over to plaintiff litigants as ammunition. '75 Therefore,
many courts hold that only those documents that were specifically created or generated for the purpose of making a required
report to a governmental agency could fall within the privilege.
One court has stated, "the privilege protects only those evaluations that the law requires one to make. 76 For example, if a
corporation prepares a document in the regular course of business and later submits that document to a governmental agency,
the document would not be protected. Generally, in jurisdictions imposing this requirement, only those documents prepared for submission to the government will be protected. This
requirement seems to contradict the purpose of the privilege,
i.e. to encourage self-critical evaluations, because if an evaluation is mandatory, disclosure cannot stifle such evaluations although it may affect the validity or accuracy of the reports to the
government. Some courts that do not impose this requirement
have held that voluntary internal studies may fall within the ambit of the privilege although they were not mandated by a gov77
ernment agency.

6. Balancing of Interests
Even in cases where the criteria outlined by the Ninth Circuit
in Dowling--or a variation of those requirements-are satisfied,
federal courts take a balancing approach. In order for the privilege to apply, "the need for disclosure must be outweighed by
the interests served in preventing disclosure. ' 7 This balancing
approach, which seems to be inherent in the privilege, regard678, 684 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Paladino v. Woodloch Pines, Inc., 188 F.R.D. 224, 225
(M.D. Pa. 1999); Hoffman v. United Telecomm., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 440, 443 (D.
Kan. 1987); Corbin v. Weaver, 680 P.2d 833, 840 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
75 Hardy v. New York News Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
76 Roberts, 107 F.R.D. at 684.
77 Trezza v. Hartford Co., No. 98 CIV. 2205, 1999 WL 511673, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
July 20, 1999); Flynn v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 91 Civ. 0035, 1993 WL
362380, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1993).
78 Gatewood v. Stone Container Corp., 170 F.R.D. 455, 459 (S.D. Iowa 1996).
In Gatewood, the court cites to the Supreme Court's decision in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990), wherein the Court stated that it does
not "apply an evidentiary privilege unless it promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence .....
University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 189.
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less of whether the Courts discuss it or not, explains why the privilege is often referred to as a "qualified" or "limited" privilege.
The balancing of public and private interests have become key
considerations when a court decides whether an asserted privilege should prevent disclosure of relevant information. 79 In balancing these interests, one court found that disclosure of

"affirmative action plans or other equal employment compliance documents (would not) have a 'chilling effect' upon employers' self-evaluations or discourage employers from frank
reflection in those reports required by the federal government.""° This same court reasoned that disclosure of such infor-

mation plays a "crucial function in civil litigation to eradicate
discrimination in the workplace."" l Thus, the outcome of
courts' balancing of the interests are often determined by the
court's view of the rationale and origins of the privilege.
The development of the privilege in the federal and state
courts differs primarily because Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence varies significantly from state rules of evidence. State
rules of evidence are often more restrictive and prohibit state
courts from creating new privileges not specifically provided for
by the state legislature.12 This distinction is consistent with the

trend of development of the self-critical analysis privilege,
which, if accepted at all, seems to remain more narrow and restrictive in the state courts. State courts have applied the privilege to medical peer reviews or hospital committee reviews, 8
internal memoranda regarding efforts to comply with governmental mandated affirmative action requirements, 4 documents
relating to a medical licensing board's investigation,8 5 reports
79 Etienne v. Mitre Corp., 146 F.R.D. at 147.

Tharp v. Sivyer Steel Corp., 149 F.R.D. 177, 182 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
Id. at 184. See also Clarke v. Mellon Bank, No. CIV.A-92-CV-4823, 1993 WL
170950, *4 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 1993) (holding disclosure of affirmative action
plans "would discourage voluntary compliance and that the public policy against
disclosure outweighed the plaintiff's need for these materials").
82 See Cloud v. Litton Indus., Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 369 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996); see also Valley Bank of Nev. v. Super. Ct., 542 P.2d 977, 978-979 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1975) (stating that "[t]he privileges contained in the [California] Evidence
Code are exclusive and the courts are not free to create new privileges as a matter
of judicial policy") (emphasis added).
83 See, e.g., Riverside Hosp., Inc. v. Garza, 894 S.W.2d 850, 855 (Tex. App.Dallas 1995, no writ) (upholding statutory application of self-critical analysis in
medical malpractice case).
84 See, e.g., Anderson v. Hahnemann Med. Coll. & Hosp. of Phila., 14 Phila. Co.
Rptr. 114, 117 (Phila. Ct. of C. P. 1985).
85 See, e.g., McClain v. Coll. Hosp., 492 A.2d 991, 998 (N.J. 1985).
80

81

2004]

SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS AD REPORTING

577

pertaining to post-accident internal investigations, 6 and documents pertaining to a healthcare provider's quality assurance
program.8 7 The privilege has been rejected in cases where parties seek to prevent disclosure of reports to the Consumer Product Safety Commission in products liability cases, 8 post-morbid
hospital investigations, 9 medical peer reviews,9 0 and numerous
other situations. State courts that accept the privilege apply it
inconsistently because there are no specific categories of documents that are considered privileged in all cases. For example,
one court may hold that post-morbid hospital reviews are protected while another court may hold that they are not.
D.

WHEN THE GOVERNMENT

SEEKS DISCLOSURE

The privilege is universally rejected when it is the government
that seeks the documents claimed to contain self-critical analysis.9 1 In almost every case where a party has claimed the selfcritical analysis privilege in response to a government subpoena
for records, the courts refused to apply the privilege. Courts
have rejected the privilege in qui tam actions by private citizens
92
on behalf of the government pursuant to the False Claims Act,
9
prosecutions for securities fraud, " grand jury investigations related to Federal Drug Administration (FDA) violations,9 4 and
administrative subpoenas by the Department of Defense against
86 See, e.g., Wylie v. Mills, 478 A.2d 1273, 1278 (N.J. Super. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 691 A.2d 321 (N.J. 1997).
87 See, e.g., Beverly Enters-Fla., Inc. v. Ives, 832 So. 2d 161, 162 (Fla. Ct. App.
2002).
88 Lamitie v. Emerson Elec. Co.-White Rogers Div., 142 A.D.2d 293 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1988); Scroggins v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 506 N.E.2d 83, 86 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1987).
89 Reyes v. Meadowlands Hosp. Med. Ctr., 809 A.2d 875, 882 (N.J. Super.
2001).
90 Cloud v. Litton Indus., Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
91 See, e.g., FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Noall,
587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663, 667
(4th Cir. 1977); In re Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Co., 214 F.3d 586, 593 (5th Cir.
2000).
92 See, e.g., United States. v. QHG of Ind., Inc., No. 1:97-CV-N4, 1998 WL
1756728, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 8, 1998); United States v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co, 915 F. Supp. 308, 313 (N.D. Fla. 1996); United States v. Allison Engine Co.,
196 F.R.D. 310, 315 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
93 In re Shalen & Assocs., No. 89-6308-CIV, 1990 WL 284508, at *1 (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 5, 1990).
94 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. 386 (D. Md. 1994).
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a government contractor. 5 One federal court noted that this
limitation of the self-critical analysis privilege "makes sense in
light of the roots of the privilege in the public interest, and the
strong public interest in having administrative investigations
proceed expeditiously and without impediment." 6 As a practical matter, the self-critical analysis privilege cannot be successfully raised in light of a subpoena from a governmental agency.
E.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS

The privilege may be used to protect a manufacturer's testing
and analysis documents during discovery in products liability
cases. Some courts have held that the public policy interest in
97
improving product safety warrants application of the privilege,
while other courts reject this application of the privilege. Required documents submitted by a manufacturer to the Consumer Products Safety Commission, which include the
manufacturer's critical evaluation of its products, testing, or procedures may be shielded from disclosure in discovery by virtue
of the self-critical analysis privilege. 9
F.

AVIATION-RELATED CLAIMS

The self-critical analysis privilege has not proliferated in the
aviation context as it has with medical peer reviews and employment discrimination. The cases are inconsistent because of the
rationale upon which the decisions are based rather than the
outcome. Notably, although the courts in each of the cases discussed below did not always uphold the privilege in the circumstances presented, the purpose behind the self-critical analysis
seems particularly strong in the aviation context. This is so because the aviation industry is one in which everyone agrees that
the public policy interest in safety is compelling.
95 United States v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 995 F. Supp. 1460, 1465 (M.D. Fla.
1998).
96 In re GrandJury Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. at 388.
97 Shipes v. BIC Corp., 154 F.R.D. 301, 307 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
98 Lawson v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 191 F.R.D. 381, 386 (D. Vt. 1999); Lamitie v.
Emerson Elec. Co. - White Rodgers Div., 142 A.D.2d 293, 296 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988).
99Shipes, 154 F.R.D. at 307 (holding that documents submitted to the CPSC
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2065(b) are protected by the self-critical analysis privilege
to the extent the information is self-critical evaluation); Roberts v. Carrier Corp.,
107 F.R.D. 678, 685 (N.D. Ind. 1985). But see Lamitie, 142 A.D.2d at 298.
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In a case in the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, In re Air CrashNear Cali, Colombia on December 20, 1995,0
American Airlines (hereinafter "American") asserted the privilege in consolidated lawsuits arising out of the crash of American flight No. 965 on December 20, 1995, in Cali, Colombia.'
In that case, the plaintiffs' steering committee (hereinafter
"PSC"), a nine-member committee representing the plaintiffs,
10 2
served American with a request for production of documents.
American objected to portions of the requests on the grounds
that the documents sought were protected by the self-critical
analysis privilege, as well as the work product privilege and attorney-client privilege. 03 The trial court held that the documents
requested could not be withheld on the basis of the self-critical
analysis privilege.104 American filed a motion for reconsideration to the extent that the order required American to produce
documents prepared in conjunction with its Aviation Safety Action Program ("ASAP"),' 10 5 which is a voluntary pilot self-reporting program designed to encourage pilots to report incidents
and violations. 0 6 The ASAP reports-after being de-identified-were reviewed by a joint committee comprised of representatives from American, the FAA, and a pilot's association,
that would issue pilot advisories, procedure changes, and individual skill enhancement recommendations. 10 7 The court rejected the application of the self-critical analysis privilege to the
ASAP reports, primarily on the basis that it could not see that
the privilege could conceivably prevent any discovery of American's post-accident review process.1 0 The court reasoned that
there would be no "chilling effect" on the review process since
American has undertaken to 'aggressively investigate' itself not
just for purposes of internal quality control, but also in order to
prepare a defense to this lawsuit, draft appropriate submissions
100 In re Air Crash Near Cali, Colombia on Dec. 20, 1995, 959 F. Supp. 1529
(S.D. Fla. 1997).
10, Id. at 1530.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104

Id.

Id. at 1531 (explaining that American's ASAP program, which is called
"American Airlines Safety Action Partnership," was a demonstration program initiated in conjunction with the FAA to encourage reporting of incidents in order
to improve safety and prevent accidents in the future).
105

106

Id.

107

Id.

108

Id. at 1533.

JOURNAL OFAIR LAW AN) COMMERCE

580

to the NTSB and the Colombian authorities and marshal evidence to present
to the media in an effort to ease any public
09
concern."1
Furthermore, the court reasoned that "the touchstone of selfcritical analysis is that it is an 'in house' review undertaken primarily, if not exclusively, for the purpose of internal quality control." 110 Although the court did not explicitly state that the
documents were not within the ambit of the privilege because
they were not kept confidential, the court pointed out that the
information contained in the pilots' reports was disseminated to
the FAA and the pilot's association."1 Despite finding that the
documents were not protected by the self-critical analysis privilege, the court did find that the work product doctrine would
protect the impressions and opinions of American's investigation team, and established a limited qualified privilege for ASAP
materials, which will be discussed later in this paper. 1 2 This
case is most important for the court's creation of a limited or
qualified privilege for the ASAP program."' It is important to
note, however, that the court did not address the availability of
the self-critical analysis protection to pre-accident internal safety
reviews. 1 4

A federal court considered whether safety meetings within
Cessna Aircraft Company (hereinafter "Cessna") regarding its
products were protected by the self-critical analysis privilege in
Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co." 5 Cessna, who was named as a defendant, brought a third-party complaint against the United
States. 1 6 At the deposition of one of Cessna's executive engineers, the government's attorney asked questions pertaining to
confidential memoranda of meetings at Cessna's corporate
headquarters at which the participants apparently reviewed, analyzed, and evaluated operations for continued improvement of
safety. 117 The court held that the circumstances in that case did
not warrant the self-critical analysis privilege." 8 Most importantly, as the court aptly pointed out, the government was not
109 Id.
110

Id.

111 Id.

Id.
113 See
114 See
115 74
112

116
117

at 1533, 1536.
id. at 1533. See infra Part III.
id. at 1531-36.
F.R.D. 518, 522 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).

Id. at 518.
Id. at 520.

118 Id. at 522.
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seeking copies of the minutes of the meetings or reports from
the meetings, because the dispute arose in the context of a deposition.' 19 The court stated "were the government seeking
herein to obtain copies of the minutes or other reports of the
actual discussions of Cessna's 'top ten' meetings, this Court
might be inclined to follow the principles enunciated" in support of the self-critical privilege. 12° The court would then "apply
a balancing approach before allowing the wholesale disclosure
of the specific details of any such meetings.' 121 The Lloyd case is
important because it does not totally foreclose the protection of
pre-accident internal safety reviews by commercial carriers or
1 22
manufacturers.
A recent case, Tice v. American Airlines, Inc.,'2 3 proves that the
self-critical analysis privilege is not dead in aviation-related
cases.1 24 In that case, retired airline pilots brought an age discrimination lawsuit against American Airlines challenging its
policy that forced the pilots to retire after they turned 60 years
old. 125 The plaintiffs sought discovery of safety reports commis119 Id.
120
121

Id.
Id.

122 See id. But see Combined Comm. Corp., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Col., 865
P.2d 893 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that pre-accident safety reviews do not
fall within the privilege while post-accident investigations may be protected). In
that case, the plaintiffs sued the PSC for the wrongful death of the decedents
when a helicopter in which they were riding collided with a transmission line
owned by the PSC. Id. at 895. This is a bizarre case in the context of self-critical
analysis privilege cases because the PSC argued after a jury awarded damages
against it that the judge erred in admitting evidence during the trial that before
the crash, the PSC had decided to put markers on the transmission lines, but had
not marked the line in question. Id. at 896. The PSC's argument was one of
admissibility and not discoverability, and it was not persuasive due to the context
in which it was made. In any event, the court held that the privilege did not
prevent the admissibility of the materials. Id. at 897. The court did not address
the timing of the assertion, but rather reasoned that "the privilege does not protect against the discovery of information developed by routine, internal corporate reviews of matters relating to safety engaged in prior to the incident upon
which the litigation is based." Id. The court further stated that post-accident
investigations may be discouraged if there was no self-critical analysis privilege,
but "general pre-accident safety reviews ... are designed to preempt litigation; it
is perverse to assume that candid assessments necessary to prevent accidents will
be inhibited by the fear that they could later be used as a weapon in hypothetical
litigation that they are supposed to prevent." Id. at 898. Of course, numerous
courts have held otherwise as is demonstrated by the preceding discussions.
123 192 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
124

Id.

125

Id. at 271.
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sioned by American, which were performed by a consulting
firm. 126 The plaintiffs did not seek the safety reports for statistical information, but to refute any safety claims American might
make in support of its policies.1

27

American objected to the re-

ports on the basis of the self-critical analysis privilege. 12 As discussed above, the court pointed out that the determination of
the applicability of the self-critical analysis privilege varied depending on whether the case involved personal injury or employment discrimination.129 The court reasoned that the case at
issue was a "hybrid" because it was an employment discrimination case in which the plaintiff sought safety reports designed to
enhance safety, and which were prepared pursuant to an FAA
mandate. 13 0 The court found that the situation was more akin

to a personal injury case, and applied the test established by the
Ninth Circuit in Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises.' The court
held that the safety reports should be protected by the self-critical analysis privilege although the court did acknowledge that
even if the reports were disclosed, it would be somewhat unlikely
that American would abandon the safety reports. The court still
expressed concern that "flow of internal airline safety informa3 2
tion would be curtailed if discovery was allowed.'

G.

WAIVER OF THE PRIVILEGE

The claim of the privilege of self-critical analysis may be
waived in certain circumstances.' 3 3 For example, the party
claiming the privilege waives it if the party seeks to rely on portions of the documents as an affirmative defense to liability.3
126

Id.

127Id. at 273.
128 Id. at 271.
129 Id.
at 272-73.
130 Id. at 273.

Id. (citing Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 426 (9th Cir.
1992)).
132 Id.
133 See Burden-Meeks v. Welch, 319 F.3d 897, 899 (7th Cir. 2003); First E. Corp.
v. Mainwaring, 21 F.3d 465, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Maxey v. GM, Civ. A. No.
3:95CV6, 1996 WL 737537, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 1996).
134 EEOC v. Gen. Tel. Co. of N.W., 885 F.2d 575, 578 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding
that employer "opened the door" to self-evaluations regarding employment discrimination by using it to prove nondiscrimination); Volpe v. US Airways, Inc.,
184 F.R.D. 672, 673 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (holding that US Airways, in objecting to
produce the related files in an employment discrimination lawsuit brought by
Volpe, waived the self-critical analysis privilege because one of its defenses relied
on its investigation and its actions subsequent to the plaintiffs claim).
131
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Furthermore, the failure to interpose the privilege at a deposition may waive the privilege."3 5 The appropriate time to raise
the self-critical analysis privilege is when the documents are
sought by the opposing party during discovery."3 6 This is not
considered an evidentiary issue because once the other side has
obtained the information, the privilege has been waived.13 7
H.
1.

PROFESSIONAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Good Faith Assertion of the Privilege

As with any privilege, professionalism and courtesy should be
exercised in asserting the privilege. Most importantly, do your
homework. Rule 3.1 of the American Bar Association's ("ABA")
Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides that "a lawyer
shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert
an issue" in the proceeding "unless there is a basis in law and
fact for doing so that it is not frivolous, which includes a good

faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law."' 138 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct also

prohibit attorneys from knowingly making a false statement of
law or fact to a court, or failing to disclose to the court "legal
authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to
be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed
39
1
by opposing counsel."

The nature of law is that it is "not always clear and never
static." 4 ' This is especially true in the context of the self-critical
analysis privilege. As the preceding discussion indicates, the
self-critical analysis privilege is not widely accepted and is not
uniformly applied. In order to raise the privilege in good faith,
it is prudent to conduct research to determine the status of the
privilege in the jurisdiction in which your case is pending. It is
important to note that few jurisdictions have outright rejected
135Moloney v. United States., 204 F.R.D. 16, 20 (D. Mass. 2001) (finding that
the failure of counsel for the United States to assert the privilege at a deposition
when the deponent was questioned regarding the alleged privileged material
constituted a waiver of the privilege).
136 Id. at 21.
137

Id.

RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 3.1 (2004): Meritorious Claims and
Contentions.
139 Id., R 3.3(a); see also id. R 3.4(a) Comment (stating "[a] lawyer shall not...
unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully destroy or
conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value").
140 Id., R 3.1 Comment.
138 MODEL

584

JOURNAL OFAIR LAW AND COMMERCE

the privilege under all circumstances. Even if your jurisdiction
has declined to recognize the privilege in employment discrimination cases, it may be inclined to recognize the privilege in the
aviation context. A good faith assertion of the privilege can be
brought in most jurisdictions as long as you keep in mind that
you may have an uphill battle in changing the court's inclination toward limiting available privileges.
Furthermore, as discussed above, a discovery objection based
on privilege must be made timely, or it is waived. When a party
objects based on privilege, the party must "describe the nature
of the documents, communications, or things not produced...
in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged
...

will enable [the] other part[y] to assess the applicability of

the privilege. '"141 Even if the privilege is timely asserted, the privilege may be waived in federal courts if these rules are not followed. 4 2 In order to avoid waiver, it is advisable
to create a
1 43
privilege log when the objection is first raised.
2. Fairness To Opposing Counsel
If you believe that the privilege may become an issue at a deposition of a corporate representative, professionalism suggests
that you consider trying to avoid surprising the opposing party
with the objection for the first time at the deposition if you have
reason to believe that information protected by the self-critical
analysis privilege may become an issue. From a practical standpoint as well, it is advisable to attempt to reach some agreement,
if possible, prior to the deposition so that your corporate representative will not have to arrange to attend two depositions instead of one. This concern is particularly important in claims of
privilege made at a deposition because you should instruct the
witness not to answer if the information requested is privileged.
Instructing a witness not to answer should not be taken lightly,
and you should make sure that you have a good basis for the
objection in this context especially. Of course, it is not always
possible to anticipate the questions that will be posed by the opposing party at a deposition.

141

142
143

FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(5).

See Ritacca v. Abbott Labs., 203 F.R.D. 332, 334-35 (N.D. Ill.
2001).
See id. at 336.
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AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING PROGRAM (ASRP)

Another area in which the public policy interest in safety has
led to immunity is the Aviation Safety Reporting Program
("ASRP"), which is a program that allows pilots, controllers,
flight attendants, and maintenance personnel to timely file reports of incidents, which may involve violations of FARs, to qualify for immunity from sanctions related to the incident.'4 4 The
filing of a report under the program, however, does not automatically establish immunity for the reporter as set forth below.
Certain procedures must be followed in filing the report, and
immunity is only available for acts that were inadvertent and not
deliberate.

A.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE

ASRP

The ASRP was established in 1975 by the FAA to encourage
the reporting of information regarding unsafe conditions in the
aviation system in the United States. 1 45 To obtain as much information as possible, the ASRP provided for immunity from sanctions for FAA violations if the violation was reported to the FAA,
and all of the reporting requirements were met.1 46 The requirements for the applicability of the initial ASRP were contained in
FAA Advisory Circular 00-46 (1975).147 In 1976, the ASRP was
changed to direct the reports to be sent directly to the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA") to encourage
reporting by ensuring confidentiality. 148 Submission of the report provided immunity from sanctions for the person making a
timely filed report. 14 9 Immunity, however, was not applied "with
offenses, gross neglirespect to reckless operations, criminal
150
gence, willful conduct and accidents.
144 See FAA Advisory Circular 00-46D (1997) (referring to the program as the

Aviation Safety Reporting System ("ASRS")).
145 Airport Development Aid Program, 44 Fed. Reg. 18,128 (Mar. 23, 1979); see
also 14 C.F.R. § 91.25 (2004).
14 14 C.F.R. § 91.25; 44 Fed. Reg. 18,128.
147 See FAA Advisory Circular 00-46D (1997).
148 See FAA Advisory Circular 00-46A (1976); see also 44 Fed. Reg. 18,128 (Mar.
23, 1979).
149 44 Fed. Reg. 18,128 (Mar. 23, 1979).
150 FAA Advisory Circular 00-46A (1976) (narrowing the immunity provided by
the NASA reports the circular stated that a person who submitted a report to
NASA could not be sanctioned unless the FAA approached NASA to inquire
about a particular incident within 45 days of the incident); see also Ferguson v.
NTSB, 678 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1982) (specifying that reckless conduct was
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In 1979, the FAA issued Advisory Circular 00-46B, changing
the express exclusion for reckless conduct from the scope of immunity. However, it did allow immunity from punishment, for
independently discovered violations, even then only if certain
requirements were met. 15 1 One of the requirements for the applicability of waiver of sanctions in FAA Advisory Circular 00-46B
was that the FAA violation was "inadvertent and not deliberate. ' '152 The current ASRP, contained in FAA Advisory Circular

00-46D, includes the requirement that the violation be "inadvertent and not deliberate" as well. 5 It provides that "[t] he effectiveness of this program in improving safety depends on the
free, unrestricted flow of information from the users of the NAS
[National Airspace System]."
The FAA uses the information
to remedy defects or deficiencies and to improve the current
system and plan for the future system.' 55
B.

SANCTION WAIVER AND PROHIBITION AGAINST FAA's USE OF
ASRP REPORTS

The timely filing of an ASRP report to NASA prohibits the
FAA from enforcing sanctions against the reporter as long as the
specific requirements of the ASRP are satisfied.' 5 6 For example,

a pilot who reports an inadvertent deviation from clearance will
not have his certificate suspended or revoked as long as the
ASRP requirements are satisfied; however, the FAA may still proceed with an enforcement action against the reporter based on
information not contained in the report and waive the sanction
due to the timely filing of the report. 57
Another important aspect of the ASRP is that the FAA is pro-

hibited from using the reports or any information derived from
excluded from sanction immunity if the FAA independently obtained information regarding the occurrence).
151 See FAA Advisory Circular 00-46B (1979).
152

See id.

153FAA Advisory Circular 00-46D (1997) (canceling the previous Advisory Cir-

cular 00-46C, which cancelled its predecessors).
154

Id.

155 Id.
156 See Adm'r v. Seyb, No. EA-5024, 2003 WL 554658, at *3 (N.T.S.B. Feb. 25,
2003).
157 See id. (holding that a pilot who inadvertently landed on the wrong runway
violated 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.123(a), 91.129(i), and 91.13(a) of the Federal Aviation
Regulations ("FARs"), but holding that FAA waived the sanction because the pilot
filed a timely NASA report).
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the reports for enforcement purposes. 158 Therefore, if the FAA
pursues an enforcement action against a pilot who has filed a
timely NASA report, the FAA may not use the information contained in the report to pursue the charges in an enforcement
action; rather it must utilize evidence and information independent of the contents of the report. 159 In addition, if the FAA
becomes aware of a violation from a source other than the report, by witness reports, for example, it may take appropriate
action and base its enforcement action on the witness state160
ments and other evidence.

It is important to note that the immunity policy and the prohibition against use of the report and information derived from
the report do not apply to actions or lack of action involving a
criminal offense, accident
or action that shows a lack of qualifi61
1
cation or competency.

C.

PROCEDURES FOR FILING AND PROCESSING

In order to preserve sanction immunity, the reporter must,

within ten (10) days after the occurrence of the operational error or deviation, complete and deliver or mail the written report
to NASA.' 6 2 Information concerning the ASRP system reporting
forms can be obtained from http://www.asrs.arc.nasa.gov.' 63
There is a general form for use by pilots, dispatchers, and airport personnel, and specific separate forms are 64available for air
1
traffic controllers, mechanics, and cabin crew.
Once NASA receives the completed form, it is initially
screened for information concerning criminal offenses (matters
which will be referred to the Department of Justice and FAA),
and information concerning accidents (which will be referred to
the NTSB and FAA).165 After the initial screening, NASA deidentifies the report by removing all personal and organizational names from the report before entering it into the

database which contains all reports not involving criminal activFAA Advisory Circular 00-46D; see also 14 C.F.R. § 91.25.
See Seyb, 2003 WL 554658, at *13.
FAA Advisory Circular, 00-46D.
Id.; 14 C.F.R. § 91-25 (2004); Facility Operations and Administration Handbook, 7210.3M, para. 2-2-9.
162 Facility Operations and Administration Handbook, 7210.3M, para. 2-2-9.
163 ASRS: Program Overview, Confidentiality and Incentives to Report (Aug.
26, 2004), at http://www.asrc.arc.nasa.gov/overview-nf.html.
158
159
160
161

164

Id.

165

FAA Advisory Circular 00-46D.
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ity or an accident. 16 6 Dates, times and related information,
which might be used to infer an identity, are either generalized
or eliminated. 6 7 The tear-off portion of the report, which contains the reporter's name, "will be removed by NASA, time
16 The restamped, and returned to the reporter as a receipt.""
ceipt should be maintained by the reporter to prove that he
filed a timely report in order to obtain immunity as long as all
other requirements have been satisfied. 69
NASA also analyzes the information contained in the report,
which is included in periodic reports of findings that are available to the public, and the FAA.' 70 The ASRP database, which is
accessible on the website, contains samplings of reports classified into categories such as flight crew fatigue, air traffic controller reports, fuel management issues, passenger misconduct
reports, runway incursions, wake turbulence reports, and nu" '
merous other categories.17
D.

"INADVERTENT AND NOT DELIBERATE" REQUIREMENT

The interpretation and application of the term "inadvertent
and not deliberate" in the context of the ASRP has given rise to
numerous administrative law opinions and decisions issued by
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)172 The deci-

sions typically arise from disputes between the FAA and the violator who submitted a NASA report as to whether the violator's
actions were "inadvertent and not deliberate" under the
ASRP. 173 Of course, often the FAA seeks imposition of a sanction even though the violator filed a timely NASA report regarding the incident because the FAA views the violations as not
"inadvertent and not deliberate.

' 174

Although NTSB decisions

166 See id.
167 ASRS: Program Overview, Confidentiality and Incentives to Report (Aug.
26, 2004), at http://www.asrc.arc.nasa.gov/overview-nf.html.
168 FAA Advisory Circular 00-46D.
169 See Adm'r v. Cain, No. SE-16342, 2001 WL 1474219, at *10 (N.T.S.B. Sept.
25, 2001) (holding that certified return receipt is not sufficient to prove the
timely filing of a NASA report because the Advisory Circular states the sole evidence of filing is the "return slip").
170 ASRS: Program Overview, Report Processing (Aug. 26, 2004), at http://
www.asrc.arc.nasa.gov/overview-nt.html.
17, ASRS:
Program Overview, Database (Aug. 26, 2004), at http://
www.asrc.arc.nasa.gov/overview-nf.html.
172 FAA Advisory Circular 00-46D.
173 See Ferguson v. NTSB, 678 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 1982).

174

See id.

2004]

SELF-CRITICAL ANAL YSIS AND REPORTING

589

and Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions do not provide
substantial analysis of the meaning of "inadvertent and not deliberate," certain categories of treatment can be discerned.'7 5
The most frequently cited case regarding the interpretation of
"inadvertent and not deliberate" within the ASRP is Ferguson v.
NTSB 1 7 6 In that case, a pilot landed at the wrong airport primarily due to his failure to take certain precautions and to verify
information. 1 77 The pilot did not know that he had landed the
plane at the wrong airport until after the landing.'7 8 The pilot
filed a timely NASA report. 1 79 The FAA argued that the sanctions for the violation should not be waived under the ASRP
because the pilot's actions did not meet all of the requirements
for applicability contained in Advisory Circular 00-46B (a predecessor to the current ASRP advisory circular 00-46D).180 The
FAA claimed that the mistake was not "inadvertent and not deliberate.'' 1 8 The Ninth Circuit extensively discussed the mean82
ing and applicability of the requirement.1
The court affirmed the NTSB's holding that for the waiver to
apply the violation must be both inadvertent and not deliberate. 183 The basis of this holding is that the terms are used in the
conjunctive rather than the disjunctive.' 8 4 The Ninth Circuit
pointed out that the FAA did not contend the violation was deliberate, but it did argue that the violation was not inadvertent.8 5 The court stated that in each instance in which the pilot
failed to comply with FAA regulations, the violation was the result of a "purposeful choice."'18 6 For example, the pilot "chose"
not to familiarize himself with all flight information or to use
navigational aids. 8 7 The court stated that "[i] t is evident that an
175 See

id. at 828.

Id. at 821.
177See id. at 824.
178 See id. at 825.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 826.
181 Id.
182 See id.
183 Id. at 828.
184 Id. See also Adm'r v. Wardenaar, No. SE-15733, 2000 WL 425843, at *8
(N.T.S.B. Mar. 15, 2000).
185Ferguson, 678 F.2d at 828.
186 Id.
187 Id.
176
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inadvertent act is one that is not the result of a purposeful
choice." '
The court provided the following useful analogy:
Thus, a person who turns suddenly and spills a cup of coffee has
acted inadvertently. On the other hand, a person who places a
coffee cup precariously on the edge of a table has engaged in
purposeful behavior. Even though the person may not deliberately intend the coffee to spill, the conduct is not inadvertent
because it involves a purposeful choice between two acts-placing the cup on the edge of the table or balancing it so that it will
not spill. Likewise, a pilot acts inadvertently when he flies at an
incorrect altitude because he misreads his instruments. But his
actions are not inadvertent if he engages in the same conduct
because 1 he
chooses not to consult his instruments to verify his
89
altitude.
The court held that the pilot's actions were not "inadvertent"
even though he did not consciously intend the particular consequences that occurred as a result of his elective actions.1 90 This
case has been used to support numerous NTSB decisions that
deny violators' immunity under ASRP based on minute distinctions between an inadvertent, unintentional mistake and a purposeful, intentional violation.
Several NTSB and FAA decisions, however, do not take such a
hard line as the Ninth Circuit did in distinguishing between actions protected by the ASRP immunity and those that are not. 19 1
In fact, the federal courts and the NTSB are bound by the FAA's
1 2
own interpretation of FAA rules.
For example, in Administrator v. Ferguson, the Administrator
sought a 45-day suspension of a pilot's certificate for departing
with ice and icicles on the elevator control system of the Cessna
188Id. at 828-29. The court relied on the definition of "inadvertence" in Ballentine's Law Dictionary, which defines "inadvertence" as "the effect of inattention, the result of carelessness, oversight, mistake, or fault of negligence and the
condition of character of being inadvertent, inattentive or heedless ....
Gross
negligence is not inadvertence in any degree." Id. at 828. The court also pointed
out that the lay definition of "inadvertent" contained in Webster's Dictionary is
consistent with the legal definition, which defines "inadvertent" as "not paying
strict attention; failing to notice or observe; heedless; wary." Id. at 829.
189

Id. at 828.

190 Id. at 829 (appearing not to strictly comport with either legal or lay defini-

tions of "inadvertent" or "inadvertence," which include carelessness, oversight,
and inattention).
191See Adm'r v. NTSB, 190 F.3d 571 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
102 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(3) (2004).
See id. at 577 (citing Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 147 (1991)).
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208.1' The pilot filed a timely ASRP report, 19 4 and claimed that
he checked the elevator system for ice prior to flight. The Administrative Law Judge found that the pilot was entitled to
waiver of the sanction under ASRP.' 9 5 On appeal, the Administrator argued that the pilot was not entitled to ASRP protection
because the pilot's failure to discover the ice was not "inadvertent."196 The Board denied the Administrator's appeal and
stated:
At some level of analysis, every act can be considered purposeful
in that a choice is made, even a choice whether to be more careful or less careful. The Administrator's argument here that respondent, in effect, was purposeful in a choice not to look as
carefully for ice as was necessary does not reflect the distinction
intended for ASRP purposes . . . the intent of the ASRP is to
exclude sanction waiver for conduct that approaches deliberate
or intentional conduct in the sense of reflecting a 'wanton disre97
gard of the safety of others' or a 'gross disregard for safety."
Therefore, some Board decisions seem to contradict the Ninth
Circuit's analysis in the sense that one is entitled to waiver unless
the circumstances show that the violator exercised a complete
disregard for safety. 9' 8
The same type of violation may or may not be entitled to
ASRP immunity depending on the judge who hears the case or
possibly the attorney acting on behalf of the Administrator. For
example, pilots who flew below flight clearances have been denied ASRP immunity, while pilots who fail to follow clear instructions to hold short on a runway are entitled to ASRP
immunity. 9' 9 The bottom line is that the application of ASRP
193 Adm'r v. Ferguson, No. EA-4457, 1996 WL 306261, at *1 (N.T.S.B. May 15,
1996).
194 See id.
195
196

Id.
Id.

197 Id. (quoting Adm'r v. Fay, 7 N.T.S.B. 951, NTSB No. EA-3316 (May 15,
1991)).
198 See Adm'r v. Ferguson, 1996 WL 306261, at *1; Ferguson v. NTSB, 678 F.2d
821, 826 (9th Cir. 1982).
199 See, e.g., Adm'r v. Kennedy, No. SE-13399, 1994 WL 804030, at *1, *10
(N.T.S.B. Oct. 2, 1994) (flying below flight clearances - ASRP waiver of sanction
denied); Adm'r v. Cardozo, 7 N.T.S.B. 1186, at #1 (1991) (flying below flight
clearances-ASRP waiver of sanction denied); Adm'r v. Mann, No. SE-11162,
1990 WL 339564; at *2, *5 (N.T.S.B. Nov. 1, 1990) (flying below flight clearances-ASRP waiver of sanction denied); Adm'r v. Paulson, No. SE-14206, 1996
WL 784848, at *2, *13 (N.T.S.B. Mar. 21, 1996); Adm'r v. Farley, No. SE-13830,
1995 WL 623860, at *2, *5 (N.T.S.B. Jan. 18, 1995) (passing beyond the hold-

592

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

immunity is not applied consistently to the same types of
violations.
Even in cases where it was determined that the pilot took off
without clearance from the ATC, the ASRP was found to apply.200 In Administrator v. Tinsley, 20 1 the pilot of a Beech C-90
requested an IFR clearance from the tower.2 0 2 He was told to

stand by.20 3 Before the IFR clearance was given, the pilot announced that he was taking off VFR and would get his IFR clearance after he was in the air. 2 4 The pilot testified that he had
received reports that it was VFR conditions and it appeared to
be VFR conditions to him. 20 5 The official weather report for the
time of takeoff was IFR.20 6 The Board determined through the

evidence presented that the conditions were actually VFR at the
time of departure. 2 7 Therefore, the Board concluded that
[M]y finding that it was VFR at that time negates any finding of a
careless or reckless operation, a violation of FAR 91.9, because if
the aircraft is being operated VFR in VFR conditions, I don't see
how there has been any showing in the evidence here today 2that
08
there was any endangerment to life or property of another.
The Board, however, did find that the pilot violated 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.75(b) by failing to wait for an IFR clearance since the official weather conditions were IFR, regardless of the actual
weather conditions. 2 9 The Board held that the pilot was entitled to waiver of the sanction because he filed a timely NASA
report.2 10
A pilot's violation of a carrier's own FAA-approved operations
specifications can be a basis for the FAA to argue that the violashort line-ASRP waiver of sanction granted); Adm'r v. Smead, No. EA-4021
(N.T.S.B. Nov. 4, 1993) (failure to hold short-ASRP waiver of sanction granted).
200 See Adm'r v. Tinsley, No. SE-12131, 1992 WL 436535 (N.T.S.B. Oct. 20,
1992).
201 Id.
202

Id. at *1.

203
204

Id.
Id.

205

Id. at *2.

206

Id.

207

Id. at *4.

Id.
Id.
210 Id. See also Adm'r v. Bushell, No. EA-3912, 1993 WL 226008 (N.T.S.B. Jun.
8, 1993) (taking off without clearance due to miscommunication with ATC entitled the pilot to ASRP immunity).
208
209
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'2 11

For example,
in Administrator v. Hunsucker, a pilot for Ozark Air Lines violated the airline's operating specifications which required that,
when operating into airports which do not have Air Traffic Control Tower services under VFR, "the pilot shall be in direct communications with the Flight Service Station or air/ground radio
communication facilities capable of providing airport traffic advisory services. '2 13 The violation occurred when, upon descent,
the pilot failed to contact the flight service station or any other
air/ground radio communications facility, given that there was
no Air Traffic Control Tower at the airport, and in violation of
the operating specifications.2 14 The pilot filed a timely NASA report under the ASRP. 2 15 The Administrator determined that
the pilot was entitled to immunity of the sanction under
2 16
21

2

ASRP.

At least one decision, Administrator v. Whicker 2 17 implies that
violation of FAA-approved flight procedures may be a basis to
find that the violation was intentional.2 18 In that case, the Administrator sought sanctions against a pilot who operated an
MD-88 on a commercial flight that ran off the end of the runway upon landing. 219 The Administrator claimed that the incident occurred because the pilot did not perform a go-around, as
required by the carrier's FAA-approved cockpit procedures,
when a stabilized approach was not achieved. 220 All parties
agreed that the carrier's operating specifications were binding
upon the pilot.22 1 The judge found that the pilot violated the
carrier's own operating procedures by failing to initiate a goSee Adm'r v. Hunsucker, No. EA-2347, 1986 WL 82480 (N.T.S.B. June 27,

211

1986).
212

Id.

Id. at *1.
Id. 14 C.F.R. § 121.2(d) (2004) (prohibiting the operation of an aircraft in
violation of the operations specifications issued for the air carrier under Part
121).
215 Hunsucker, 1993 WL 226008, at *2.
216 Id. See also Adm'r v. Curry, No. EA-2294, at *1-2 (N.T.S.B. Mar. 18, 1986)
(allowing sanction immunity under ASRP where pilot failed to use approved
cockpit check procedures for the exterior air inlet ducts prior to takeoff).
217 Adm'r v. Whicker, No. SE-15613, 1999 WL 1335095 (N.T.S.B. Sept. 20,
1999), affd by Adm'r v. Whicker, No. EA-4959, 2002 WL 406984 (N.T.S.B. Mar.
11, 2002).
218 See id. at *10.
219 Id. at *1.
220 Id.
221 Id. at *3.
213
214
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around, as required by the carrier's Flight Operations Manual
and Pilot Operations Manual, when he was unable to establish a
stabilized approach.2 2 2 Additionally, the judge found that there
was no reasonable explanation for why the pilot did not initiate
a go-around as required. 223 The judge further held without discussion that the pilot was not entitled to ASRP immunity because the failure to initiate the go-around was a "conscious and
225
deliberate decision. 224 The decision was affirmed on appeal.
IV.

AVIATION SAFETY ACTION PROGRAM (ASAP)

Another example of the creation of a privilege for the benefit
of the public interest in safety is the qualified immunity and
privilege available for evaluations created pursuant to the FAA's
voluntary Aviation Safety Action Program ("ASAP"), which is
similar in some respects to the ASRP. 226 The FAA designed
ASAP "to encourage air carriers and repair station employees to
voluntarily report safety information that may be critical to identifying potential precursors to accidents. ' 227 The goal of ASAP is
to resolve safety issues through corrective action rather than
punishment or discipline. 228 The FAA's Advisory Circular concerning ASAP establishes guidelines for Part 121 carriers and
repair stations to set up ASAP programs in conjunction with the
FAA and third parties, such as the effected employees' labor unions. 229 The program was initiated through demonstration programs such as USAir Altitude Awareness Program, the American
Airlines Safety Action Partnership, and the Alaska Airlines Altitude Awareness Program, and over two dozen additional programs have since been established. 230 The FAA will not pursue
enforcement actions against a person who makes an ASAP report as long as the qualifications for the report are satisfied, and
at *10.
id.
224 Id. (finding that even the first pilot for the flight was also subject to an
enforcement action, but that his failure to properly confirm the deployment of
the spoilers was inadvertent and not deliberate).
225 Adm'r v. Whicker, No. EA-4959, 2002 WL 406984 (N.T.S.B. Mar. 11, 2002).
226 See FAA Advisory Circular 120-66B (2002).
227 Id.; FAA Order No. 1110.129 (July 3, 2003) (establishing the ASAP Aviation
Rulemaking Committee ("ARC") to serve as a forum for interaction among the
FAA, industry employee groups, airlines, and repair stations regarding ASAP
goals, issues, and concerns).
228 FAA Advisory Circular 120-66B (2002).
229 Id. at 4.
230 Id. at 2.
222 Id.
223 See
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at least one federal court has held that ASAP reporters are enti1
tled to qualified immunity in civil litigation. 2
A.

IMMUNITY FROM ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

The FAA guidelines regarding the ASAP program provide
that the FAA will not use the content of any ASAP report in any
subsequent enforcement action as long as the specific requirements of the program have been satisfied. 23 2 Each carrier or
repair station will design its own plan in conjunction with the
FAA, but must adhere to the FAA-established guidelines and ob23 1
tain specific approval from the FAA for the program.
In order to come within ASAP protection, the report must be
timely. 234 A report will be considered timely if it is filed within
twenty-four hours of the event, or within twenty-four hours after
the reporter became aware of the event. 235 The twenty-four

hour time requirement is not a hard and fast rule because the
Event Review Committee (ERC), which is comprised of representatives of the certificate holder, FAA and union, may determine that the report was filed timely upon a consideration of
the specific circumstances.23 6 Moreover, "the alleged regulatory
violation must be inadvertent, and must not appear to involve
an intentional disregard for safety." 23

7

Although the term "inad-

vertent" is not defined in the Advisory Circular, the meaning will
likely be defined by the FAA's interpretation of the terms in
2 s In addition,
other contexts, such as the ASRP.
the reported
event must not appear to involve "criminal activity, substance
abuse, controlled substances, alcohol, or intentional falsification. '2 39 Finally, ASAP immunity is not available to the reporter

if the "events... occurred when NOT acting as an employee of
the certificate holder."240

This is important to note because a

pilot employed by a commercial air carrier with an ASAP program should not report any discrepancies within the ASAP pro231 Id. at 7, 14; Tom Longridge, Changes to ASAPAC, ASAP Symp. (20-21 No.
2002), availableat http://www.asy.faa.gov/proactive/FOOA-&-ASAP/ASAP-PolicyChgs.pdf (lasat visited Dec. 12, 2002).
232 FAA Advisory Circular 120-66B at 7.
233 Id. at 4-5.
234 Id. at 7.

237

Id.
Id.
Id.

238

See id.

235
236

239 Id. at 8.
240

Id. at 9.
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gram that the pilot may have encountered while flying outside
the scope of his employment. 24 1 In such circumstances, the pilot should restrict reports of the discrepancy to the ASRP to
242
maintain protection from sanctions.
The determination of whether a specific report meets the criteria for inclusion in the ASAP will be determined by the
ERC. 241 Any non-complying reports will be forwarded to the

FAA for appropriate enforcement action. 244 Neither the report
nor contents of the report will be used for FAA enforcement
purposes unless the report involves criminal activity, substance
abuse, controlled substances, alcohol, or intentional
falsification.245
B. CONFIDENTIALITY AND QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE
The FAA recently issued FAA Order 8000.82 on September 3,
2003, which provides that information received from the FAA or
any other government agency pursuant to the ASAP is protected
from public disclosure in accordance with 14 C.F.R. part 193.246

Disclosure is prohibited even with regard to requests made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. 247 The policy reason

for the order stated by the FAA is that "withholding ASAP information from disclosure is consistent with the FAA's safety and
security responsibilities because, unless the FAA can provide assurance that it24will
not be disclosed, the FAA will not receive the
8
information."

Information protected from disclosure includes the ASAP report, the contents of the report, the identity of the certificate
holder associated with the ASAP report, the name of the employee who submits the report, information from an ERC invesSee id.
See Aviation Safety Reporting System, 44 Fed. Reg. 18128 (Mar. 23, 1979).
243 FAA Advisory Circular 120-66B at 6.
241
242
244
245

Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.

246 FAA Order No. 8000.82 (Sept. 3, 2003) ("Designation of Aviation Safety
Action Program (ASAP) Information As Protected From Public Disclosure Under
14 CFR Part 193"). See also 14 CFR § 193.11 (2004) (continuing implementation
of the statute); 49 U.S.C. § 40123(a) (1996) (providing that certain safety and
security information voluntarily provided to the FAA is protected from disclosure
in order to encourage people to provide the information to the FAA); 68 Fed.
Reg. 38,594 (2003) (issuing similar protection for information received from the
FAA under the Flight Operational Quality Assurance Program ("FOQA")); FAA
Order No. 8000.81.
247 FAA Order No. 8000.82.
248

Id.
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tigation of the report, "evidence gathered by the ERC during its
investigation, statistical analysis and trend information provided
by the certificate holder that is based on events reported under
the certificate holder's ASAP," "a certificate holder's database of
reports and events collected over time," and "corrective action
on sole source reports when corrective action is successfully
completed." 249 ASAP reports involving possible "criminal activ-

ity, substance abuse, controlled substances, alcohol, or intentional falsification are" exempted from the order prohibiting
disclosure.25 °
In 1994, American Airlines and a pilot's association in conjunction with the FAA created their own version of the ASAP,
the American Airlines Safety Action Partnership, in order "to
identify and reduce or eliminate possible flight safety concerns,
as well as to minimize deviations from Federal Aviation Regulations.

'2 51

American's ASAP is a voluntary self-reporting program

designed to report incidents and violations, including deviations
during "flight, taxiway or runway incursions during ground operations, and navigational or terrain-avoidance problems. 252
The operation of the program is similar to the ASRP in that it
allows pilots to make reports of problems that may involve a violation of the FARs. 25 3 Like the ASRP, the reports are de-identified and reviewed on a weekly basis by American, the pilot's
association, and the FAA, who may issue advisories, procedure
changes or individual enhancement training to improve
safety.

2 54

A federal district court held that American's ASAP reporters
are entitled to qualified immunity in civil litigation in In re Air
Crash Near Cali, Colombia on Dec. 20, 1995.255 In that case, which
is discussed in part II above, American Airlines argued that documents prepared pursuant to its ASAP were entitled to a qualified privilege in a case involving the crash of American Airlines
Id.
Id.
251 See In re Air Crash Near Cali, Colom. on Dec. 20, 1995, 959 F. Supp. 1529,
1531 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. (stating that although the program was initially restricted to flight crews,
it was later expanded to include dispatch and maintenance departments). See
Evan P. Singer, Recent Developments in Aviation Safety: Proposals to Reduce the Fatal
Accident Rate and the Debate Over Data Protection, 67 J. AIR. L. & COM. 499, 526
(2002).
255 Singer, supra note 254, at 527.
249
250
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Flight No. 965, near Cali, Colombia.25 6 American argued that
there was a compelling public interest in improving safety of
commercial travel, and that disclosure of the reports would suppress the pilots from reporting violations of the FARs for fear of
dissemination of the information.2 5 7 The court agreed stating:
"without a privilege, pilots might be hesitant to come forward
with candid information about in-flight occurrences, and airlines would be reluctant, if not altogether unwilling, to investigate and document the kind of incidental violations and general
flight safety concerns whose disclosure is safeguarded by the
258
ASAP program.
The court also noted that "t] here is a genuine risk of a meaningful and irreparable chill from the compelled disclosure of
29
ASAP materials in connection with the pending litigation.
The Cali court stressed that the privilege would be qualified, and
could be overcome by a "highly particularized" showing of need
by the party seeking the documents. 260 Since Cali, there have
been no reported cases involving the qualified privilege for
ASAP reports.2 6 1
V.

THE MACHIN PRIVILEGE: MILITARY AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS

Yet another example of a privilege established to protect and
encourage the free flow of safety information is the Machin privilege for military aircraft accident investigative reports. 26 2 After
an accident involving a military aircraft, the branch of the military involved conducts two wholly separate, independent investigations: a "collateral investigation" and a "safety investigation"
256 In re Air Crash Near Cali, Colom. on Dec. 20, 1995, 959 F. Supp. at 1532 (rejecting American's argument that the ASAP documents were protected by the
self-critical analysis privilege).
257 Id. at 1534.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 1535.
260 Id. at 1536.
261 Singer, supra note 254, at 527.
262 See Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963). In Machin, the court
noted that the military and state secrets privilege allows the United States and
branches of the military to block discovery in a lawsuit of any information that, if
disclosed, would adversely affect national security. Id. at 339. "Even the most
compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake." United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1.11 (1953).
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with separate investigating teams. 26 "The collateral investigation is conducted to preserve available evidence for use in
claims, litigation, disciplinary actions, administrative proceedings, and all other purposes. '264 Witnesses in the collateral investigation testify under oath and generally are protected by the
procedural safeguards that are applicable in other formal hearings. ' 26 5 The entire record of collateral investigations is publicly
available.266
The other investigation, a safety investigation, is conducted by
a specially appointed tribunal that prepares a report for the
"sole purpose of taking corrective action in the interest of accident prevention. 267 It is an attempt to "secure the quality of
information and candid opinions required in order to identify
the specific causes of the accident and thus prevent its repetition. ''26 8 In order to encourage witnesses to speak fully and

frankly, they are not sworn and the witnesses receive assurances
that their statements will not be used for any purpose other than
accident prevention. 269 Personal opinions and speculation are

invited by the witnesses, and statements against interest are frequently obtained.27 °
In the seminal case, Machin v. Zuckert, 271 confidential statements made to military air crash safety investigators were held to
be privileged during pre-trial discovery. 272 In Machin, a plaintiff
who sued United Aircraft Corporation, a manufacturer of propeller assemblies served the Air Force with a subpoena for its
aircraft investigation report of an incident where he was injured
in a crash of an Air Force B-25 bomber.273 The Government
263 United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 795 (1984). Depending on the military branch, the names of the two reports vary. For example, the
Navy's publicly available report is called the 'Judge Advocate General Manual's
Investigations." Sometimes the "safety investigation" report is referred to as the
"mishap report."
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id. (citing A.F. Reg. 110-14,
1(a) (July 18, 1977)).
267 Id. (citing A.F. Reg. 127-4,
19(a)(1) (Jan. 1, 1973)).
268 Badhwar v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 829 F.2d 182, 183 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
269 Id. at 185.
270 Cooper v. Dep't of the Navy of the United States, 558 F.2d 274, 276 (5th
Cir. 1977).
271 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
272 See id; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1006
(Fed. Cir. 2003).
273 Machin, 316 F.2d at 337.
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claimed that the documents were privileged. 274 The court

agreed, and stated "when disclosure of investigative reports obtained in large part through promises of confidentiality would
hamper the efficient operation of an important Government
program and perhaps even, as the Secretary here claims, impair
the national security by weakening a branch
of the military, the
275
reports should be considered privileged."

Since Machin, courts have applied the privilege to requests for
information and documents contained in the military's safety investigations of air crashes. 276 The Machin privilege has been reaffirmed even in suits filed under the Freedom of Information
Act ("FOIA") .277 In the context of air crash cases, the plaintiff
brings suit against the United States under the FOJA after it refuses to produce its safety investigation reports to the plaintiff in
response to a subpoena in the plaintiffs case against the manufacturer of the aircraft or one of its parts. 27 The Supreme
Court extended the Machin privilege to FOIA cases in United
States v. Weber Aircraft Corp.279 In Weber, the plaintiff claimed that
he was entitled to the statements made by witnesses during the
Air Force's safety investigation. 2

°

The Court found that the wit-

nesses' statements were within the Machin privilege, which protects the statements from discovery in civil litigation and they
are not available to any party other than the Air Force. 28 ' The

Court also found that Exemption 5 of the FOIA, which provides
that "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters
which would not be available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with the agency," are not subject to disclosure under the FOIA, incorporating the Machin privilege. 28 2 Ac-

cordingly, a person may not obtain privileged portions
of an air
23
crash safety investigation through a FOIA request.

Id.
Id. at 339.
276 See, e.g., United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 802 (1984);
Cooper v. Department of the Navy of the United States, 558 F.2d 274, 275 (5th
Cir. 1977); Badhwar v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 829 F.2d 182, 183 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
277 Cooper, 558 F.2d at 275, 277.
278 See id. at 275.
279 465 U.S. 792 (1984).
280 Id. at 796.
281 See id. at 802, 803.
282 Id.
283 See id. at 802.
274
275
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In Badhwar v. United States Department of Air Force,284 the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia articulated a qualification to the Machin privilege by noting that certain factual findings contained in safety investigation reports could be revealed
without suppressing such investigations in the future. 285 The
court held that the Machin privilege protects factual information
contained in the safety investigation reports if such information
would compromise the promise of confidentiality, or "otherwise
reflects official deliberations or recommendations as to policies
that should be pursued.12 6 "This test is adequate to distinguish
between those employees whose statements are not privileged
(e.g. non-implicated mechanics reporting on the wreckage) and
those whose candor depends on the assurance of non-disclosure." 287 Statements and facts volunteered by technical representatives in the aviation industry or contractors who assist in
the investigation may be therefore protected under these cir28
cumstances, even in the context of an FOLA request.
A recent case, In re Petition of McAllister Towing & Transportation Co., Inc.,289 illustrates the nexus between the Machin privilege and the self-critical analysis privilege. In that case, a district
court held that the Navy's "mishap report" was protected from
disclosure pursuant to the self-critical analysis privilege.29 ° Although Machin would certainly be implicated, the court did not
address the privilege; but rather, based its holding on the selfcritical analysis privilege. 29 1 This case illustrates the courts' continued public policy concern in protecting self-critical analysis in
the interest of safety while weighing the private litigant's need
for such reports.
It is unclear whether the self-critical analysis and other privileges regarding self-critical reports will continue to permeate
civil litigation. It is apparent, however, that such privileges have
a place in contexts, such as aviation, in which the goal of safety
for the public overrides an individual litigant's desire to discover
such information in order to obtain civil damages.
284

829 F.2d 182, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

285 Id. at 185.
286
287
288
289
290
291

Id.
Id. at 184 (citing Machin, 316 F.2d at 339).
See id.
No. Civ. A. 02-858, 2004 WL 1240667, *1 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 2004).
Id. at * 1.
Id.
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